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The Abortion Question: Germany's Dilemma Delays
Unification
As a reunified Germany begins to jell, one divisive topic remains
to be settled. This issue is abortion. East German law freely permitted
abortion on demand within the first three months of a pregnancy., West
Germany allowed abortions only if a woman met one of four criteria:
endangerment to the mother's health, risk of damage to the child,
pregnancy as a result of rape, or a life sithation that would make raising
a child difficult. 2
In the summer of 1992, the German Parliament, the Bundestag,
voted to extend the liberal abortion law of East Germany to all of
Germany and to add a restriction that women were required to obtain
counseling at least three days before obtaining the abortion.' This leg-
islation was signed into law by German President Richard von Wei-
zaecker. However, the German Constitutional Court issued a temporary
injunction blocking the new law on the day before it was to go into
effect, due to a petition submitted which alleged the new ruling was
unconstitutional because it violated the German Constitution's provision
guaranteeing protection of human life.4 After two days of arguments
in December 1992, the Federal Constitutional Court announced it was
postponing its decision until August 4, 1993. Until the ruling is issued,
Germany, politically united since October of 1990, will remain separated
on the issue of abortion.
A comparison of constitutional and legislative solutions to the abor-
tion question is necessary to discover a resolution to the crisis facing
Germany. West Germany and Canada are examples of two countries in
which antithetical constitutional approaches to the abortion problem were
formed. Countries in which the abortion question has been managed
legislatively must also be examined. Finally, a solution to the crisis
facing Germany will be proposed after an evaluation of the competing
© Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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interests involved in the abortion question and an analysis of these
interests in providing a long-term solution for Germany.
I. WEST GERMANY AND CANADA: CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AND
PROTECTION OF THE ABORTION RIGHT
The definition of a constitutional right must first be established to
distinguish such rights from those derived legislatively. According to
Black's Law Dictionary, a constitutional right is "a right guaranteed to
the citizens by the United States Constitution and state constitutions
.and so guaranteed as to prevent legislative interference therewith." 6 A
broader definition is necessary for purposes of analysis of the abortion
right in a multi-national context. A definition of constitutional right as
one that cannot be removed or modified by legislation is appropriate
to begin an examination of the resolutions to the abortion question
proposed by West Germany and Canada.
A. West Germany
Commencing with the midpoint of the nineteenth century, the Ger-
man states distinguished abortion as an independent crime from the
killing of a newborn. 7 Germany's abortion law originated from sections
181 and 182 of the Criminal Code for the Prussian State of 1851 which
prohibited a woman from having an abortion.' This provision remained
in effect until the law of 1926, which softened the criminal penalties
for abortion by exempting the woman from prosecution for obtaining
an abortion.9 The criminal penalties for abortion were again sharply
increased and extended to women during the Third Reich due to the
passage of the Regulations for the Protection of Marriage, Family, and
Motherhood of 1943.10 In 1969, the latest provision was enacted to
continue the imposition of criminal penalties on the woman."
6. Black's Law Dictionary 312 (6th Edition, 1990).
. Albin Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences, 34 Am. J.
Comp. L. 369 (1986).
8. Section 181 reads, "A pregnant woman who intentionally aborts the fetus or
kills it in the womb, shall be punished with a term of up to five years in the house of
correction. Should extenuating circumstances be present, punishment shall be for not less
than six months. The same provisions apply to anyone who, with the consent of the
pregnant woman, provides the means for abortion or killing; or procures same for her."
9. Michael Quaas, Federal Republic of Germany, 7 Comp. L. Y.B. 41, 42, (1983).
10. Id.
11. The 1969 Law reads, "A woman who destroys her fetus or permits it to be
destroyed by another shall be punished by imprisonment, and in especially serious cases
by confinement in a penitentiary. The attempt is punishable. Any other person who
destroys the fetus of a pregnant woman with a drug or object designed to destroy the
fetus, shall be punished by imprisonment, and in especially serious cases by confinement
in a penitentiary."
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West Germany consisted of a federal republic composed of ten states,
and the making of abortion policy fell exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the national government. 2 In 1972, the Bundestag passed the Abortion
Reform Act which would have made abortion legal in the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy if the woman first obtained counseling intended to
discourage her from obtaining an abortion.' 3 The Reform Act was not
brought as a defense of a woman's right to interrupt a pregnancy, but
rather was based on a theory of deterrence. The counseling section of
the new law was regarded as a more effective means of deterring pregnant
women from obtaining an abortion and of protecting an unborn life
than a resort to criminal penalties. 14
The Act was immediately brought before the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court for review. The Federal Constitutional Court invalidated
section 218(a) of the Abortion Reform Act and directed the German
Parliament, in effect, to reestablish abortion as a crime under the Penal
Code. 11
Invoking article 2, section 2 of the Basic Law, the court held that
the right to life embodied in the Basic Law was intended as a reaction
against the extermination of "unworthy" life carried out during the
time of the Third Reich.' 6 The court found that "Life, in the sense of
the historical existence of a human individual exists according to definite
biological-physiological knowledge in any case from the fourteenth day
after conception." Thus, the court extended the guarantee of article 2,
section 2 of the Basic Law to born as well as "unborn life." Once the
court established that "unborn life" was included in the conception of
"everyone" in article 2 of the Basic Law, the court determined that
the fetus was entitled to protection not only from the state, but from
third parties as well.
The German decision is even more interesting in light of other
provisions of the German Constitution. Pregnancy belongs to a woman's
12. Donald P. Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and Germany,
25 Am. J. Comp. L. 256, 258 (1977).
13. Section 218(a) of the Abortion Reform Act provided that an abortion is not
punishable if advisable to avert a danger to the pregnant woman's life or the danger of
grave interference to her health and the danger cannot be averted by other reasonable
means, or strong reasons argue that the child, owing to a hereditary disposition or harmful
influences before birth, would suffer from irreparable injury to its state of health which
would be so severe that the continuation of the pregnancy could not be demanded of
the pregnant woman.
14. Douglas G. Morris, Abortion and Liberalism: A Comparison Between the Abortion
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Constitutional Court of
West Germany, 11 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 159 (1988).
15. Decision of February 25, 1975, 39 BVerfG 1.
16. Art. 2, § 2 of the German Basic Law states, "Everyone shall have the right to
life and to inviolability of his person."
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realm of privacy constitutionally guaranteed in Article 2, Section 1.17
This right is combined with the guarantee of dignity in article 1, section
1 of the Basic Law. 8 However, the court rejected the idea that the
woman's decision to destroy a fetus, once pregnancy has occurred,
deserved the same constitutional protection as her decision not to become
pregnant in the first place.' 9 The court concluded that the woman's right
to free development of her personality included the right to decide against
parenthood and the duties growing out of it, but this right was not
unrestricted when involving the rights of others, the constitutional order,
and the moral law.
The German Constitutional Court did not view the fundamental
issue as whether a woman has a constitutionally based right to an
abortion. Instead, the issue considered by the court was that human
life, including fetal life, requires protection, and the decision was whether
the legislature had chosen means that would best protect human life.20
The court found the Abortion Reform Act to be constitutionally
defective on two grounds. First, it failed to expressly embody an official
disapproval of abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
Second, when combined with an amendment providing that the state
would pay for the abortion, it was an unlawful encouragement to women
wishing to terminate their pregnancies.2 '
An international law case arose from the decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court. Two West German nationals filed a formal com-
plaint with the European Commission on Human Rights alleging that
the court's decision violated certain provisions of the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The German government defended the decision on two grounds: pro-
scribing a woman from obtaining an abortion does not interfere with
her right to privacy since other means of family planning are available,
and interference with the right to privacy in order to prevent a crime
is permissible under Article 8(2) of the Convention. 2 The Commission,
in its decision on the merits, did not find a breach of article 8 of the
European Convention because the claim to respect for private life is
automatically reduced to the extent the individual brings his private life
17. Art. 2, § I provides, "Everyone shall have the right to the free development of
his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or the moral code."
18. Art. 2, § 1, of the Basic Law provides, "The dignity of man shall be inviolable.
To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority."
19. Kommers, supra note 12, at 269.
20. Morris, supra note 14, at 164.
21. Kommers, supra note 12, at 270.
22. Aaron E. Michel, Abortion and International Law: The Status and Possible
Extension of Women's Right to Privacy, 20 J. Fam. L. 241, 247 (1981-82).
1318 [Vol, 53
COMMENTS
into contact with public life or with other protected interests. In addition,
the Commission reasoned that not every regulation of the termination
of unwanted pregnancies results in an interference with the right to
respect the private life of the mother.23
B. Canada
The earliest Canadian statutory prohibition against abortion derived
from an 1869 statute based on England's Offenses Against the Person
Act.Y The Canadian government attempted in 1969 to achieve a com-
promise solution to the abortion debate with a reform intended to satisfy
both pro-life and pro-choice factions. The reform introduced an excep-
tion that provided for the performance of legal abortions when approved
by a designated therapeutic abortion committee as necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother. If the woman did not meet the statutory
exception, she and the person performing the abortion were subject to
imprisonment under the Canadian Criminal Code. 2
The Canadian Supreme Court recently invalidated these Criminal
Code provisions in the case of Regina v. Morgentaler "as infringing on
a woman's right to security of the person in derogation of principles
of fundamental justice contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.' '26 At the time of Morgentaler, Canadian abortion law had
been stable for over two decades. 27 Application of the abortion law had
changed, but this change was attributed to the varying interpretations
of medical professionals, rather than the differing opinions of the courts.
2
1
23. Id. at 249.
24. Jennifer Coates, Note, A Comparison of United States and Canadian Approaches
to the Rights of Privacy and Abortion, 15 Brook. J. Int'l L. 759, 784 (1989).
25. Section 251 of the 1987 Canadian Criminal Code reads in part,
(1) Every one who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a female person,
whether or not she is pregnant, uses any means for the purpose of carrying
out his intention is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable for imprisonment
for life.
(2) Every female person who, being pregnant, with intent to procure her own
miscarriage, uses any means or permits any means to be used for the purpose
of carrying out her intention is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to
imprisonment for two years.
(3) In this section, "means" includes (a) the administration of a drug or
other noxious thing, (b) the use of an instrument, and (c) manipulation of any
kind.
26. 1 S.C.R. 30 (1988); See also 44 D.L.R. 4th 385 (1988); Berta E. Hernandez, To
Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an International Human Right, 17 Brook.
J. Int'l L. 309, 310 (1991).
27. Donald L. Beschle, Judicial Review and Abortion in Canada: Lessons for the
United States in the Wake of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 61 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 537, 555 (1990).
28. Id.
131919931
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The decision in Morgentaler was unusual because neither party was a
woman who alleged that she had been unable or delayed in obtaining
an abortion. Instead, the claim of violation of the rights of women was
brought by medical practitioners whose business had been interrupted. 29
The central issue before the court was whether the abortion pro-
visions of the Criminal Code infringed on the Canadian Charter guar-
antee of the "right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice."30 The court focused on the psychological stress
on the woman of being subject to criminal sanctions and the inacces-
sibility of the therapeutic abortion exception. The court found that "state
interference with bodily integrity and serious state-imposed psychological
stress, at least in the criminal law context, constitutes a breach of security
of the person. '"' The court thus went beyond the traditional limited
interpretation of "life, liberty, and security of the person" to recognize
an area of emotional and physical integrity with which the state could
not constitutionally interfere.3 2 Although this concept of freedom from
state interference approaches the notion of privacy, the court declined
to interpret the right in this broader sense.33 In effect, the court read
Section 7 of the Charter to protect against the invasion of emotional
and physical integrity that resulted from arbitrary application of the
therapeutic abortion exception. 34
After Morgentaler, the abortion question was raised in another
decision, Borowski v. Attorney-General.31 Mr. Borowski obtained stand-
ing to bring a case before the Supreme Court of Canada to argue the
fetus had a right to life on the basis that he had "a genuine interest
as a citizen in the validity of the legislation and that there is no other
reasonable and effective manner in which the matter may be brought
before the court." '3 6 As plaintiff, he alleged that unborn children are
included within the meaning of the term "individuals" in the Canadian
Bill of Rights, that the amendments do not -make any provisions for
29. Mary Ann Glendon, A Beau Mentir Qui Vient de Loin: The Canadian Abortion
Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 569, 578, (1989).
30. Regina, I S.C.R. 30.
31. Id. at 32.
32. Id. at 37.
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id. at 33-34; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act 1982,
part I, § 7 provides, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice."
35. Borowski v. Canada (Attorney-General), 1 S.C.R. 342 (1989).
36. Moira L. McConnell, Even by Commonsense Morality: Morgentaler, Borowski
and the Constitution of Canada, " 68 Canadian B. Rev. 765, 785 (1989).
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the abortion committees to consider the life or health of the unborn,
that the procedures of the committee deprive the unborn of a fair
hearing, and that the unborn are denied their fundamental right to life.17
The Supreme Court of Canada declared the Borowski case moot because
the law Borowski was challenging, the Criminal Code provision allowing
access to abortion, had been struck down in Morgentaler.3 s
The Canadian Senate attempted in 1991 to remedy the state of so-
called "lawlessness" which existed after the Morgentaler decision. The
proposed Bill C-43 attempted to impose the threat of criminal sanctions
in order to discourage pregnant women from obtaining abortions and
to eliminate the right of Canadian women to have unrestricted access
to medical facilities in order to obtain abortions.3 9 The bill was defeated,
but it is the opinion of more than one writer that another proposal to
criminalize reproductive choice may well be made in the future. 40 Such
action would be particularly surprising considering the conflict it would
pose to the constitutional principles enunciated in Morgentaler. However,
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which provides that all rights in
Canada are subject to the reasonable limits of a free society, may furnish
fertile ground for another challenge placing restrictions on the ability
of Canadian women to obtain abortions. 4' In addition, Section 33 of
the Charter permits Parliament to make laws that will infringe on rights
guaranteed under the Charter, and Section 7 provides that rights may
be infringed upon in accordance with principles of fundamental justice. 42
37. Borowski, 1 S.C.R. 342.
38. Moira L. McConnell, Sui Generis: The Legal Nature of the Fetus in Canada, 70
Canadian B. Rev. 548, 551 (1991).
39. C-43 2d Session, 34th Legislature, 1st Reading, Nov. 3, 1989: In parts of Canada,
doctors or hospitals have refused to perform abortions, making them unavailable to women
without the psychological and financial resources to travel. This issue was discussed in
Nicholas Bala and Martha Bailey, Canada: Controversy Continues Over Spousal Abortion
and Support, 29 J. Fain. L. 303 (1990-91).
40. Lorenne Clark, Abortion Law in Canada: A Matter of National Concern, 14
Dalhousie L.J. 81, 87 (1991).
41. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads, "The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstratably justified in a
free and democratic society."
42. Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an
Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section
2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made
under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but
for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five
1993]
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Thus, Canada, through the judicial repeal of its Criminal Code
provisions restricting abortion in the Morgentaler decision, experienced
dramatic change in its policy on abortion. In the coming years, Canada
may again see attempts at change, similar to the failed Bill C-43, due
to the inability to reach a solution to the abortion question.
II. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE ABORTION QUESTION
For purposes of analysis, a legislative right is defined as one which
is provided for and may be modified by ordinary legislation. Many
countries have chosen to deal with the abortion question by providing
legislative solutions for their citizens. The following countries will be
examined in this context: the former Soviet Union, India, Australia,
China and Israel.
A. The Former Soviet Union
The history of Soviet legislation on abortion can be divided into
four periods: prior to 1920 when abortion was illegal, 1920-1936 when
abortion was legal with some restrictions, 1936-1955 when abortion was
illegal with some exceptions, and 1955-present when abortion has been
legal with exceptions.4 3 The Soviet Union liberalized its law in 1955 to
achieve two purposes: to reduce the harm done to the health of women
by abortions performed at non-state hospitals, and "to give women the
possibility of deciding [for] themselves the question of motherhood.""
Such rapid swings in the nature of abortion policy are remarkably
different from the more evolutionary approach seen in the history of
Western countries. 45 Of course, the recent and rapid changes in the
organization of the Soviet states may once again impact abortion laws.
An understanding of the scheme of rights is important before one
can examine the right to abortion in the Soviet system. The concept of
"right" in former Soviet law is translated from "prava," a Russian
word that also means law.46 "Right" in this subjective sense means the
years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in
the declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration
made under subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection
(4).
43. Mark Savage, The Law of Abortion in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the People's Republic of China: Women's Rights in Two Socialist Countries, 40 Stan.
L. Rev. 1027, 1030 (1988).
44. Colin Francome, Abortion Freedom: A Worldwide Movement 128 (1984).
45. J.A. McMahon, Abortion, Asking the Rights Question?, 18 Victoria U. Wellington
201, 205 (1988).
46. Savage, supra note 43, at 1031.
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possibility for a person or organization to engage in certain conduct
which is provided by a legal norm and protected by the state.4 7 Rights
in the former Soviet Union did not have consistent meaning or content
and depended on the circumstances at the instant point in history. As
a consequence, the form or expression of a right could be the same at
different points in history, but the meaning of the right changed as the
material, social, and historical circumstances of the individual and the
society changed.4 8
These distinctions may not remain after the sweeping changes in the
former Soviet Union. The abortion right as a constitutional guarantee
was not provided for in the recent Federative Treaty. This absence is
explained by the need to enact a form of government before specifying
the rights meted out by that government. Considering the history of
abortion discussed supra, it will be presumed that the abortion right
will be enforced as it has been in the past.
The Soviet Union has generally been characterized as a society in
which abortion is permitted at the unconditional request of the woman, 49
and in which the most significant aspect has been the plethora of
abortions.50 It has been estimated that four out of five pregnancies of
Soviet women end in abortion, averaging nine abortions over the course
of a Soviet woman's life." It is estimated that somewhere between nine
million and eighteen million abortions occur each year in the former
Soviet Union.5 2 The enormous scale of abortion is more a result of the
unavailability of adequate contraception than any respect for the right
of women to control their bodies. 3 Consequently, the use of abortion
as a form of birth control is deeply ingrained.5 4 In essence, abortion is
regarded as an inevitability regardless of legal status.5
Under Soviet law as it existed prior to the formation of the Soviet
federation, "the government permit[ted] abortion upon request within
the first twelve weeks of conception and [did] not require specific ju-
ridical or socioeconomic grounds for abortion." 5 6 The 1955 Decree laid
down the following restrictions on the availability of abortions:
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Mezey, infra note 149, at 693.
50. Lawrence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 56 (1990).
51. Ron Popeski, Motherhood in Ukraine a Lonely Experience, The Reuter Lib. Rep.,
Oct. 29, 1992.
52. Women's Medical Center Gives Russian Women New Choices, PR Newswire,
Sept. 29, 1992.
53. Id.
54. Savage, supra note 43, at 1063.
55. Tribe, supra note 50, at 57.
56. Savage, supra note 43, at 1060.
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i. abortions are to be performed only in licensed medical in-
stitutions;
ii. a woman seeking an abortion must first receive a certificate
from a doctor which confirms that an indication for an abortion
exists [i.e., a threat to the life or health of the mother or where
a threat exists to the health of the fetus];
iii. before the operation, the reasons for the application and
the possible adverse medical consequences are discussed with the
woman .17
After twelve weeks, abortion was permitted rarely and only for medical
reasons endangering the mother's life or health or for genetic defects,
hereditary disease, and such. 8 Thus, an abortion had to be performed
in a state hospital, and penalties were applied only to doctors who
performed abortions anywhere other than in state hospitals.19
Administrative regulations required that a midwife counsel every
woman who wanted to have an abortion and approve the request for
the abortion.6 Further procedural requirements included the consent of
the woman, performance of the abortion in a hospital or other lawful
establishment, and a small fee in the case of legal abortions undertaken
for other than medical reasons.6 '
The government in the past, as regulator of individual rights, limited
a woman's ability to obtain an abortion by placing a number of obstacles
in her path. 62 Women who could not meet the criteria were forced to
seek illegal abortions.6 3 Approximately seventy percent of women in
cities and ninety percent of women in rural areas who terminated their
first pregnancies by abortion chose illegal abortions."
The question remains whether abortion will have the status of a
constitutional or legislative right in the individual Soviet states. It appears
that because abortion has become a normal part of Soviet society,
abortions will continue to be prevalent. The present system of legislative
control may continue, but the number of obstacles placed in the path
of women seeking to obtain an abortion will be reduced because the
government will no longer have the role of regulator of rights under
the new Federation of Soviet States. The individual Soviet states may
choose to answer the abortion question by elevating abortion to the
57. McMahon, supra note 45, at 203.
58. Savage, supra note 43, at 1060.
59. Hernandez, supra note 26, at 350.
60. Savage, supra note 43, at 1060.
61. Id.
62. See supra text at notes 57-61.
63. McMahon, supra note 45, at 207.
64. Savage, supra note 43, at 1062.
[Vol. 531324
COMMENTS
status of a constitutional right and accordingly enacting such protection
in their individual constitutions.
B. India
India is a federal democratic republic consisting of twenty-five states
and seven territories which exist within a constitutional system of checks
and balances. 65 Although the 1949 Indian Constitution contains many
centralizing features with regard to policy-making and governmental
structure, the Indian federal framework gives significant autonomy and
home rule to ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other group interests.6
The states do not have individual constitutions but are governed under
the relevant provisions of the Indian constitution, which sets forth the
basis for state governmental organization and powers. 67 Under the Indian
constitution, the head of the Indian government is the president, who
is nominally vested with the executive power. 6 The legislative power is
vested in a bicameral Parliament composed of the Council of States,
the Rayja Sabha, and the House of the People, the Lok Sabha.69 All
courts in India form a single hierarchy, with the Supreme Court of
India as the highest court of appeal.
Laws were enacted in 1971 allowing abortion. 70 These laws came
into effect in 1972 in the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, "which
permit[ted] abortions when it is likely that the child will be born with
significant physical or mental abnormalities or when the birth poses a
threat to the physical or mental health of the woman."' The latter
category has been broadly interpreted to provide unrestricted access to
abortions.7 2 India currently provides women with free abortions, in-
cluding those performed at state-owned hospitals. 7
Unlike in the West, abortion in India is not regarded as a part of
a woman's natural right to bodily autonomy. Abortion is primarily
viewed by the government as a solution to India's mounting health,
population, and illegal abortion problems. 74 Women in India view abor-
65. Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy
Arrangements 118 (Danial Judah Elazar ed., 1991) [hereinafter Federal System of the
World].
66. Id. at 119.
67. Id. at 121.
68. Id. at 119.
69. Id.
70. Francome, supra note 44, at 156.
71. Tribe, supra note 50, at 63.
72. Id.
73. Mother Teresa Says Abortion "Nothing Short of Killing," United Press Int'l,
Dec. 27, 1992.
74. Tribe, supra note 50, at 63.
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tion as a means of eliminating female fetuses to avoid burdening the
family with the obligation of an expensive dowry. In a number of Asian
countries the use of amniocentesis to determine the gender of an embryo
and the consequent abortion of female fetuses has become increasingly
common." This problem has appeared most markedly in India where
there exists a strong preference for sons and free access to amniocentesis
and abortion.7 6 This practice has raised a peculiar dilemma for Asian
feminists and others who see abortion in terms of a woman's right to
bodily autonomy. These feminist groups are put in the position of
defending a woman's right to an abortion even at the expense of female
fetuses. One solution suggested to curb sex-selective abortions is to
restrict the availability of amniocentesis and other sex determinative
tests.7
In 1988, the government of the Indian state of Maharashtra (of
which Bombay is the capital) passed a law permitting amniocentesis only
if the woman is at least thirty-five years old or has a medical or family
history that suggests the likelihood of genetic disorders.7 8 This legislation
was prompted in part by a survey completed in 1988 which revealed of
the eight thousand abortions carried out in Bombay, 7,999 were female
fetuses.7 9 Groups that continue to support abortion upon request argue
that such legislation impinges upon the relationship between a doctor
and patient and unduly restricts a woman's right to have an abortion
for her own reasons.80 In addition, some of these groups allege that
since women are oppressed in Indian society, sex-discriminatory abortions
may be a benefit to the female fetus.8" Others suggest that significant
reductions in the female population may serve to improve the status of
women in Indian society. Contrarily, those groups concerned with the
implications of sex-discriminatory abortions point out that women can
go to other states to have such tests performed. 2
Legislation was filed in Parliament at the urging of the Indian
government in August 1992, to place restrictions on the use of tests
that determine the sex of a fetus.83 The purpose of the restrictions would
75. Id. at 65.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Rosalyn Chissik, India: Children Sentenced to Death for Being Female, Reuter
Textline Guardian, Dec. 4, 1990; John Ward Anderson & Molly Moore, Women in the
Developing World Face Cradle-to-Grave Discrimination, Poverty, The Wash. Post, Feb.
14, 1993, at Al.
80. Tribe, supra note 50, at 65.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. India to Limit Fetal Sex Tests, The Montreal Gazette, Aug. 17, 1992.
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be to check the increasing abortion of female infants.A4 Under the
proposed legislation, prenatal diagnostic tests would be confined to
registered health centers, and testing solely for the purpose of determining
a fetus's sex would be banned. 5 Currently, final action has not been
taken on this legislation.
The Indian Supreme Court has failed to consider the abortion issue
and, in light of current legislation, is unlikely to address the issue in
the future. It is feasible the restrictions on the use of the amniocentesis
procedure will be passed by Parliament because of the dramatic shifts
in the demographics of Indian society due to the decreasing number of
females born each year.
C. Australia
The framers of the Australian Constitution used two models for
their new constitution: the American and the Canadian documents.8 6
They preferred the American example; although they omitted two sig-
nificant features of the American Constitution, that is, a Bill of Rights
and the presidential system. 87 An Australian Bill of Rights has been
proposed but has yet to be passed into existence. 8
Generally, Australia has a federal structure similar to the United
States. The legislative power of the Commonwealth in Australia is vested
in a bicameral federal Parliament as set forth in the Australia Consti-
tution of 1900 and executive power, though formally vested in the
Governor-General, is actually vested in the federal cabinet.8 9
The Federal Supreme Court is the highest court in the Common-
wealth of Australia." Each state and territory of Australia has its own
court system which is hierarchically structured downward from the state
supreme court.91
84. India to Restrict Pre-Natal Gender Tests, The Reuter Lib. Rep., Aug. 12, 1992.
85. Peter Goodspeed, India Harnesses Technology to Kill its Girls, The Toronto Star,
Feb. 4, 1993, at A17.
86. Hon. Anthony Mason, The Australian Constitution 1901-1988, 62 Australian L.J.
752 (1988).
87. Id.
88. Terence Purcell, Rights in the Constitution: The Bill of Rights Revisited, 62
Australian L.J. 268 (1988).
89. Federal Systems of the World, supra note 65, at 155.
90. "The [Australia Supreme] Court has jurisdiction over all matters arising under
treaties or affecting foreign representatives, matters between states, matters to which the
Commonwealth is a party, and matters between residents of different states. The High
Court has acquired the power of judicial review of the constitutionality of certain laws
enacted by Parliament, state parliaments, and administration of the territories by inference
from the federal constitution." Id. at 24.
91. Id. at 157.
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Given the lack of a Bill of Rights or national law on abortion, the
failure of the Australian Supreme Court to announce national legal
standards and rights and the national legislature's failure to pass national
abortion legislation have left each state free to implement its own abor-
tion scheme. 92 Abortion is technically illegal in most Australian states,
but courts give doctors wide discretion to perform abortions they think
appropriate. 93
The states of the Commonwealth of Australia are New South Wales,
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, and Tas-
mania.94 Individually, they have generally found a right to an abortion
based on whether the woman's mental health is endangered by the
pregnancy. The parameters of this right vary from state to state.
The first state to pass a more liberal abortion law was South
Australia in 1969. 91 Its act allowed abortion if two doctors agreed that
"continuance of the pregnancy would involve greater risk to the life of
the pregnant woman or greater risk of injury to the physical or mental
health of the pregnant woman than if the pregnancy were terminated."9'
In Victoria, the same result was achieved judicially in R. v. Dav-
idson,97 a 1969 case in which the state supreme court concluded that
an abortion was not unlawful where there was danger to the woman
either physically or mentally. The accused was charged with four counts
of unlawfully using an instrument to procure the miscarriage of a woman
and one count of conspiring to procure the miscarriage of a woman. 9
The court specified that for therapeutic abortion to be lawful, "the
accused must have honestly believed on reasonable grounds that the
[abortion] was necessary to preserve the woman from some serious
danger.'"' The court then extended the element of danger to include
not only danger to life but also danger to physical or mental health
other than the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth.
In New South Wales, the law in operation from 1900 allowed
abortion if the woman's life or mental or physical health was judged
to be endangered by the pregnancy. Mental health was considered to
include social and economic stress on the woman. 10°
92. Tribe, supra note 50, at 68-69.
93. Australia Church Sparks Outcry by Backing Abortion, The Reuter Lib. Rep.,
Sept. 28, 1992.
94. Federal Systems of the World, supra note 65, at 155.
95. Francome, supra note 44, at 151.
96. Id.
97. R. v. Davidson, Supreme Court of Victoria, 1969 V.R. 667.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 671.
100. Francome, supra note 44, at 151.
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A recent case appealed from the Supreme Court of Queensland to
the High Court of Australia elucidates the general Australian position
regarding abortion, although it fails to enunciate a national legal stan-
dard. Mr. Kerr sought to restrain a woman from obtaining an abortion
when she was six weeks pregnant. He claimed the child was his, although
the woman and Kerr were not married or living together, and they had
intercourse on only one occasion.10 The court found it unjustifiable to
permit the injunction because to do so would "interfere in the most
serious way with her (the woman's) liberty of action."'' 0
The court also stated, in agreeing with another Australian jurist, 103
that a fetus has no rights until it is born and exists apart from its
mother. The court stated: "There are limits to the extent which the law
should intrude upon personal liberty and personal privacy in the pursuit
of moral and religious aims. Those limits would be overstepped if an
injunction were to be granted in the present case."'' 4
There is significant demand in Australia for national legislation and
standards regarding abortions, primarily because federal funding for
abortion is widely available. 05
A judge in a recent decision in the state of Victoria determined
that the fetus had no right to be born when deciding whether a husband
could prevent his wife from having an abortion.'0 The husband had
applied to a court in northern Australia's Queensland state for an
injunction preventing his estranged wife, who was five months pregnant,
from aborting their child.1'7 The case turned on whether the fetus had
rights under common law. The judge concluded it did not.1' 8
The right to an abortion in Australia is legislatively based and
restricted. The legislation is, in effect, state and common law based.
Abortion, as a right, has not been provided for in the Australian
constitution nor by the Australian Parliament. However, this omission
has allowed the individual Australian States to" implement their own
abortion laws that generally grant women the right to an abortion.
D. China
The word for "right" in the People's Republic of China is "quan,"
which means, remarkably, both the rights of citizens and the powers
101. Attorney General (Ex Rel Kerr) v. T., 46 A.L.R. 275 (1983).
102. Id. at 277.
103. Sir George Baker in Paton v. BPAS Trustees, 1 Q.B. 276 (1979).
104. Id. at 278.
105. Tribe, supra note 50, at 69.
106. Judge Allows Abortion, Says Unborn Baby Has No Legal Right, The Reuters
Lib. Rep., July 12, 1989.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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of the state. 0 9 In China, rights inhere in citizenship and only citizens
enjoy rights. The instability of rights in general in China is important
in the evaluation of the abortion right in that country.
In March 1978, the Fifth National People's Congress adopted a new
Constitution. Article 53 of the Constitution provides that the state
supports family planning."10 The article reads:
Women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of political,
economic, cultural, social and family life. Men and women enjoy
equal pay for equal work. Men and women shall marry of their
own free will. The state protects marriage, the family, and the
mother and child. The state advocates and encourages family
planning.
However, the Constitution also provides that freedom and rights may
not infringe upon the interests of society and the collective. Thus, rights
exist only when the state creates them and grants them to citizens. Rights
have no independent basis in human nature or human conditions."'
Inherent in this reality is the instability of a right. Specific rights are
"freely" given if deemed to be in the state's best interest and are
withdrawn when their purpose is served." 2 Administrative regulations
that have implemented laws and established the content of rights change
as quickly as the state reevaluates the effect of the regulations on the
state's interest. Further, the content of a right may change as Party
policy changes or as statutes or regulations change."' Essentially, rights
are creatures of the state that are held by citizens. Their content and
limits are determined only by the needs of the government at any point
in time. A citizen has no rights that the state has any duty to protect
other than those of the worker consistent with the superior interest of
the people-the socialist good.' 4
Abortion was legalized by a directive from China's Minister of
Health in 1957 to control population growth, raise living standards, and
continue the effort to industrialize." '5 The People's Republic of China
prohibits the birth of more than one child per family." 6 If economic
109. Savage, supra note 43, at 1069.
110. 2 Honguo Xianfa Art. 53 (1980), translated in I Laws and Regulations of the
People's Republic of China 1, 14 (1982).
Ill. Savage, supra note 43, at 1069.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1072.
115. Francome, supra note 44, at 132.
116. Savage, supra note 43, at 1091.
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incentives do not motivate birth control, abortion is used to end any
pregnancies that violate the state's policy.117 Therefore, abortion is state
mandated when a woman who already has one child becomes pregnant.
Recently, a pregnant Chinese woman fled to Australia by boat and
survived a desert trek to seek asylum for fear of a forced abortion in
her home country.'
China's one family, one child rule and compulsory abortion policies
greatly undermine the rights accorded to female children, similar to the
situation in India." 9 The failure to bear a son is a tragic failure to a
Chinese couple, resulting in a loss of someone to carry on the family
name and other Chinese customs.120 The result has been that couples
to whom daughters have been born have increasingly resorted to the
drowning or abandonment of their infant girls in order to be entitled
to another chance to have a son.1 2'
China allows women to obtain abortions in order to achieve gov-
ernmental objectives. This availability would qualify as a legislative right.
Although the right may be eliminated by ordinary governmental action,
given the problem of population growth faced by the Chinese, the
possibility of the state eliminating a woman's ability to seek an abortion
is unlikely. China is unusual because abortion is state mandated and
enforced where a family already has one child. However, family planning
officials indicate they are ready to ease the country away from its
controversial one-child policy because of international criticism and the
increasing resistance of its citizens to the state-mandated abortion pol-
icy. 122
E. Israel
Although into its fortieth decade of independence, Israel has yet to
formalize its constitutional principles into a written document. In the
country's formative years, its leaders heatedly debated the need for a
formal constitution.' There were efforts to draft a constitution and
one draft contained an abridged chapter on fundamental rights, similar
to the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution.'2 However, the
117. Id. at 1092.
118. Nine Chinese Granted Refugee Status in Australia, The Reuter Lib. Rep., July
24, 1992.
119. Tribe, supra note 50, at 62.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Sheila Tefft, Chinese to Ease Strict Family Planning Policy, The Christian Sci.
Monitor, Jan. 11, 1993, at the World 2.
123. Marina 0. Levy, Note, Restructuring a Democracy; An Analysis of the New
Proposed Constitution for Israel, 22 Cornell Int'l L.J. 115, 118 (1989).
124. Asher Maoz, Defending Civil Liberties Without a Constitution: The Israeli Ex-
perience, 16 Melb. U. L. Rev. 815, 818 (1988).
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end result was what one author has called the "Great Israeli Compro-
mise: Creeping Constitutionalism." '25 The compromise resolution was
named the "Harari Resolution"'' 26 and endorsed the idea of a constitution
while setting forth a vague process for the constitution's piecemeal
preparation. 2 7 Due to political conflicts, no constitution was enacted.
Israel is a nation that has gradually moved from imposing significant
criminal penalties on abortion to a system with relatively few restric-
tions.' 2  As a nation, Israel has not formally debated the abortion
question, because of the religious restrictions in the nation's political
and legal systems. 29 Thus, until relatively recently, Israel retained re-
strictive abortion laws on its books, and most abortions were performed
privately and illegally. 30
This matter is further complicated by the presence of two opposing
views in the Jewish faith toward abortion. According to one view, the
fetus is not considered a life until it is born, and it may be destroyed
in order to preserve the life of the mother.'"' Under the other view,
where no mitigating circumstances exist and the reason for an abortion
is to avoid a financial or emotional inconvenience, Jewish law clearly
forbids the taking of potential life.13 2
In 1966, the abortion law was liberalized to the extent that it was
no longer a crime for a woman to obtain an abortion. 3 3 The District
Court of Haifa ruled that abortions openly performed on bona fide
medical grounds were permissible. 3 4 Although abortions were permissible
for medical reasons after 1966, the criteria for obtaining an abortion
125. Levy, supra note 123.
126. The Resolution reads, "The first Knesset charges the Constitutional Legislative
and Judicial Committee with the duty to prepare a draft Constitution for the State. The
Constitution shall be composed of individual chapters in such a manner that each of
them shall constitute a basic law in itself. The chapters shall be brought before the Knesset
to the extent which the Committee will terminate its work and all chapters together will
form the State Constitution," cited in Amos Shapira, Judicial Review Without a Con-
stitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56 Temp. L.Q. 405, 410 (1983).
127. Id.
128. Mezey, infra note 149, at 694.
129. Id. at 694 n.30.
130. Paul E. Slater et al., Illegal Abortion in-Israel, 13 Israel L. Rev. 411 (1978).
131. Shlomo Riskin, The Fetus as Potential Killer, The Jerusalem Post, Feb. 8, 1991,
citing the Mishnayot Ohalot 7:6, "If a woman suffers a difficult childbirth, we are allowed
to destroy the fetus in the woman removing the fetus limb by limb, because the mother's
life takes precedence over the child's. But if the head (or major portion of the body) of
the child has emerged, the newborn cannot be harmed because one life cannot push aside
another life."
132. Id.
133. Slater, supra note 130, at 411.
134. Francome, supra note 44, at 147.
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were not clearly defined, and most women were thus forced to obtain
abortions privately and illegally. 135
Hospitals established "pregnancy termination committees" to con-
sider abortion requests. These committees -consisted of gynecologists,
psychiatrists, and social workers that gradually developed similar reasons
for granting an abortion. These criteria generally consisted of: 1) danger
to the health or life of the mother; 2) anticipated malformation of the
fetus; 3) rape, adultery, incest; and 4) problems caused to the mental
or social health of the mother.' 36
In 1977, the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, repealed the 1936 Crim-
inal Code section relating to abortion and enacted the Penal Law Amend-
ment on Interruption of Pregnancy which exempted from prosecution
abortions performed by a doctor with the approval of a committee
composed of two doctors and a social worker.' The purpose of the
amendment was to abolish the discrepancy between the total prohibition
according to the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936 and the extremely
different reality. 3 '
The basic criteria of the hospital committees were codified in the
penal law amendment which also gave legal standing to the hospital
abortion committees.' 39 A committee composed of two physicians and
a social worker, once satisfied that the woman has given her informed
consent, must find one of five justifications. 40 The most important of
these dealt with danger to the woman's physical or mental health or
with contributing to a woman's difficult social or family situation.
Further, the law provided that no criminal penalty attached if an abortion
was urgently required to save the mother's life, to prevent grievous
harm, or to satisfy a need that unexpectedly arose during the course
of an operation.' 4'
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Mezey, infra note 149, at 695.
138. Ze'ev W. Falk, The New Abortion Law of Israel, 13 Israel L. Rev. 103 (1978).
139. Slater et al., supra note 130, at 411.
140. The Israeli Penal Law Amendment, § 5. reads,
The committee may after obtaining the woman's informed consent, approve the
interruption of pregnancy if it considers it justified on one of the following
grounds: 1) the woman is under marriage age or has completed her fortieth
year; 2) the pregnancy is due to relations prohibited by the criminal law or
incestuous relations, or extramarital relations; 3) the child is likely to have a
physical or mental defect; 4) continuance of the pregnancy is likely to endanger
the woman's life or cause her physical or mental harm; 5) continuance of the
pregnancy is likely to cause grave harm to the woman or her children owing
to difficult family or social circumstances in which she finds herself or which
prevail in her environment.
See also Falk, supra note 138.
141. Id. at 103.
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In spite of the allegedly broad nature of the exemptions, large
numbers of applicants are in fact denied permission because they fail
to conform to these criteria. 42 If none of the exceptions apply, abortions
remain illegal and punishable with a possible penalty of five years
imprisonment or a fine of fifty thousand pounds."s3 The woman is
exempted from responsibility for an unlawful abortion under section 9
of the Israeli Abortion Law.' 44
In 1979, section 5 was repealed because of political deal-making. 14S
Forty-three percent of abortions were performed under this exception
for family or social circumstances of the woman.' 46 Although this ex-
ception was repealed to reduce the number of abortions, it actually did
not because women simply obtained illegal abortions. 147
Thus, in Israel, women have a limited legislative right to an abortion.
Israel has specifically enacted legislation, which in the absence of a
written constitution, enables women to obtain abortions upon meeting
certain criteria. However, women who cannot receive the necessary ap-
proval can obtain illegal abortions from private doctors and will often
choose this option because they are not subject to punishment for
obtaining abortions. Thus, although one of the criteria for obtaining
an abortion was repealed, it did not decrease the number of abortions
because more women chose to obtain illegal abortions. 41
III. AN ANSWER FOR GERMANY
Germany must resolve the abortion question in order to finally
complete the process of unification it began in October of 1992. One
writer, Susan Gluck Mezey, argues that the scale of abortion rights
varies on a spectrum between two extremes. On one end of the spectrum,
the state determines the status of the fetus by criminalizing the abortion
procedure and imposing governmental penalties upon those who perform
or obtain abortions. "49 At the other end of the spectrum, the state is
142. Id.
143. The Israeli Law reads, "A person who knowingly interrupts a woman's pregnancy,
either by medical treatment or in any other manner, shall be liable to imprisonment for
a term of five years or a fine of fifty thousand pounds." Laws of State of Israel Special
Volume, Penal Law 5737-1977, Ch. 10, Art. 2, § 313.
144. Falk, supra note 138. Section 9 of the Penal Law Amendment reads, "A woman
upon whom an offence under this Law is committed shall not bear criminal responsibility
in connection with that offence."
145. Francome, supra note 44, at 148.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 149.
149. Susan Gluck Mezey, Civil Law and Common Law Traditions: Judicial Review
and Legislative Supremacy in West Germany and Canada, 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 689,
691, 1983.
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completely removed from the decision-making process, and the matter
is placed entirely in the hands of the pregnant woman by allowing her
to decide whether or not to bear the child. 150 However, this analysis
fails to recognize those countries in which the state removes itself from
the decision-making process, but allows regulation within the country
by other governmental units. An example of one such country is Australia
in which individual states have the power to restrict or enlarge the
abortion right. The spectrum analysis also fails to account for govern-
ments in which abortion is state mandated under certain circumstances,
such as China.
The competing interests in the abortion question can be better an-
alyzed by using the shape of a pyramid. The abortion pyramid helps
to identify the competing elements in the abortion question and thus a
possible resolution to the German crisis may be proposed after posi-
tioning the countries previously discussed on such a pyramid.
ABORTION PYRAMID
MOTHER
150. Id.
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On one side of the pyramid, the interests of the mother are rec-
ognized as predominant. Countries which establish their abortion policies
based on the best interest or danger to the mother form this side of
the pyramid. Such countries include Canada where criminal code pro-
visions limiting women's access to abortion were struck down as in-
fringing on a woman's constitutionally guaranteed right to life, liberty,
and security of the person. The former Soviet Union is another example
of a country which recognized the right and interest of the mother over
the other interests on the pyramid. Abortion was first liberalized in the
former Soviet Union to allow women to decide about motherhood and
to provide for safe conditions in which to obtain abortions. Similarly,
Israel is a country in which the mother's interests dominate because
abortion is allowed when a pregnancy causes danger to the woman's
physical or mental health or contributes to difficult social or family
circumstances of the woman.
Countries in which the interest of the fetus is recognized form the
second side of the pyramid. West Germany is placed onto this side of
the pyramid because the fetus's life was recognized as paramount to
any other interest, and criminalization of the abortion procedure ensued.
In West Germany, the court granted the fetus protection under its
constitutional provision that "Everyone shall have the right to life."
The third side of the pyramid is formed by those countries in which
the abortion right is determined according to the interest or directive
of the government. One example of such a regime is China, where abortion
is freely allowed to further the government's one child per family rule.
China's committed enforcement of its one child policy leads to forced
abortions where a woman who already has one child becomes pregnant.
Thus, the interest of the government in controlling population growth
outweighs the interests of both the mother and the fetus. Another country
which could be placed on this side of the pyramid is India, where the
government is urging restrictions on the use of sex-determinative tests
in order to halt the disproportionate abortion of female fetuses. Ac-
cordingly, the Indian government deems its interest in maintaining normal
male to female ratios in its society to overide the family's or mother's
interest. In addition, a system such as Australia's may also be considered
to fall on this side of the pyramid. The government in Australia has
failed to recognize either the interest of the mother or the fetus. By
default, the government has chosen to remove itself from the decision
making process and allow individual states to expand or limit a woman's
ability to obtain an abortion. Consequently, the government recognizes
its own interest in being insulated from the abortion question rather
than recognizing the interest of the fetus or the mother.
The question must now be answered. Where on the abortion pyramid
must Germany place itself? West German law found the interest of the
fetus to predominate. East German law found the interest of the mother
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to predominate by allowing abortion on demand within the first three
months of pregnancy. In the midst of these two competing traditions,
the new German law must avoid the throes of the abortion paradox in
which compromise between the three sides of the pyramid achieved in
the name of a long-term solution prevents any resolution from achieving
longevity. Generally, a compromise in which a country places itself at
an apex of the pyramid rather than recognizing one of the competing
interests as superior is doomed to last only until one of the interests
attains superior status. For example, Canada's attempt at compromise
in 1969 was invalidated in the Morgentaler decision, and the result has
been a state of "lawlessness" because of a failure to answer the abortion
question. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court bears the enormous
burden of deciding which side of the abortion pyramid is most appro-
priate for the reunified Germany.
The best choice for Germany's social and political future is one
cognizant of the need for effective unification. The easiest political
solution would be for the Federal Constitutional Court to judicially
enact the legislation passed by the Bundestag. The legislation was de-
signed to allow women access to abortion with the requirement that a
woman obtain counseling at least three days prior to obtaining the
abortion. This action would place Germany on the side of the abortion
pyramid recognizing the interests of the mother. This solution would
facilitate long-term acceptance of th decision due in part to its emergence
from the democratic process. The legislation had been passed by the
German Parliament and signed into law. A resolution to the abortion
question as a result of the legislative process is unusual in constitutional
countries such as Germany where an answer generally emerges from the
courts due to the unwillingness of other branches of government to act
or to act in cooperation. Thus, the German court's willingness to ju-
dicially enact legislation could establish an unusual "alliance" between
judicial and legislative determination of the abortion question. This
combination could facilitate a positive solution to Germany's dilemma
and may allow Germany to avoid the abortion paradox and finally find
an answer to the question of abortion.
However, West Germany, because of increased wealth, size, and
population, has in many ways subsumed East German culture during
the process of unification. The West German tradition that the interest
of the fetus should prevail is likely to cause continued conflict if the
solution herein proposed is adopted. This fact is characteristic of the
reality that there is no easy answer to the abortion question.
Terri E. Owens
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